Reporting famine; changing nothing by Franks, S.
Franks, S. (2014). Reporting famine; changing nothing. British Journalism Review, 25(3), pp. 61-
66. doi: 10.1177/0956474814550602 
City Research Online
Original citation: Franks, S. (2014). Reporting famine; changing nothing. British Journalism 
Review, 25(3), pp. 61-66. doi: 10.1177/0956474814550602 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/12166/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Famines are not a simple story  
BJR 2014 
 
23rd October  2014 marks  the thirtieth anniversary of a significant 
moment in modern TV journalism:  Michael Buerk’s broadcast 
about a ‘biblical famine’ filmed in  a remote part of northern 
Ethiopia. The images  shot by Kenyan cameraman Mohammed 
Amin, together with Buerk’s powerful words, produced one of the 
most famous television reports of the late 20th Century. 
In an era before satellite, social media and YouTube, the BBC  
news item from Ethiopia went viral - being transmitted by well over 
400 television stations worldwide. NBC even chose, almost 
exceptionally, to include it on their main news bulletin without 
revoicing Michael Buerk’s  original English commentary.  
Bob Geldof of the Boomtown Rats viewed the news that day and 
as a result Buerk’s famine report eventually became the focus of a 
whole new style of celebrity fundraising. This in turn produced 
another key television memory for a certain generation, the Live 
Aid extravaganza in July 1985 which itself became a transforming 
moment in modern media history. 
The serendipity of news means that some stories resonate while 
on another day they would be ignored. It was pretty random that a 
report about very poor (black) people starving in a faraway country 
firmly loyal to the Soviet bloc and with no UK connection, should 
become such  a major news story. And looking back it was the 
collision of various random factors that seems to have propelled 
the reporting of this famine to the top of the news agenda.  
One of the most unlikely was the strike that Autumn by ITV 
technicians. Michael Buerk was not the first journalist to reach 
Korem in northern Ethiopia and to witness the suffering. There was 
another reporter Peter Gill who got there first. He filmed a report 
for the Thames TV programme “TV Eye”. But when Gill returned to 
base there was no one to edit his material because of the strike. 
This gave the BBC the sense that they had an ‘exclusive’ and 
could steal a march on the opposition. Chris Cramer the BBC 
Foreign Editor at the time is quite unashamed that they took great 
pleasure in beating ITN with the pictures of the famine. But it also 
meant he took another interesting and far reaching decision. Once 
Cramer knew there was no danger of ITV getting in first and long 
before the pressures of instant 24 hours news, he allowed Buerk 
the luxury of returning to BBC HQ in the UK to edit his material at 
relative leisure rather than having to cobble together a ‘script on 
the back of an envelope and shovel something on a satellite from 
Nairobi’. Buerk is clear that having this extra time to think about  
and craft his script meant a huge difference. Those memorable 
words devised on the long night flight back were the result of that 
precious commodity that news journalism so often lacks – time to 
think. He recalls ‘It took half a continent to get the opening right, 
working and reworking the sentences with the shotlist in front of 
me but the mind’s eye back in Wollo and Tigray…..’  
 
Raising funds differently 
A huge fund raising bandwagon started to roll in the days after the 
original BBC report, including the newspaper proprietor Bob 
Maxwell chartering the Mirror Mercy mission to fly in supplies to 
Addis. Meanwhile a parade of celebrities and politicians from 
Mother Teresa to Senator Ted Kennedy rushed to reach the 
feeding camps in northern Ethiopia that Christmas. Such was the 
power of this reporting that even today Ethiopia, a country 
attempting to brand itself as a fast growing economy full of vibrant 
new enterprise, is still for many audiences defined by these historic 
images of famine from thirty years ago.  
 
As a result of the media attention there was a whole new direction 
to public philanthropy in Western countries. Instead of charitable 
giving to faraway poor people being seen as worthy and a little 
dull, it became hip and cool. When Tony Blair launched the 
Commission for Africa  in 2004 he referred to the way that his 
generation had been inspired by the Ethiopian famine coverage 
and Live Aid. 
Despite all the fine memories of how suffering had been relieved 
by this remarkable effort, in the intervening years a number of 
more troubling and complicated issues have clouded these 
certainties. To start with are we even correct to identify this as the 
famine of 1984? Famines are long slow burning emergencies 
rather than sudden events like tsunamis or earthquakes, which are 
always much more appealing in news terms. It now appears (from 
FOI documents) that diplomats, aid agencies and journalists had 
been trying to attract attention to the suffering in Ethiopia from 
1982 when the severity of the food shortage first became 
apparent, but editors and news desks were not interested. Mike 
Wooldridge as BBC International Development correspondent 
went on press trips organized in 1983 and March 1984 by Save 
the Children and UNHCR to the feeding camps in Tigray and tried 
to get some attention for his story, but with little success. So it is 
more accurate to date the famine as 1982-1985 but the unpleasant 
problem is that the real appeal of food insecurity as a news story is 
catalyzed  when there are images of stick thin children dying.  
In the aftermath of Buerk’s news story there were hand-wringing 
post-mortems  and ‘how can we do this better’ sessions within aid 
agencies, Select Committees and the Overseas Development 
Administration (forerunner to DFID). They asked why no one had 
been able to focus crucial media attention when the widespread 
shortages were first becoming evident. The conclusion was that 
very often a famine is only judged to be news when these horrible 
images are present.  But worryingly after the famine in East Africa 
in 2011 the same criticisms of the media interest only coming too 
late were still being made. And still today the same syndrome is 
happening elsewhere in Africa. BBC International Development 
correspondent Mark Doyle tweeted in July  2014 that ‘famines are 
sexy, predicting them is not’ drawing attention to a report on the 
approaching disaster in South Sudan. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-28143584 Here once 
again, just as in 1980s Ethiopia, the famous conclusions of 
Amartya Sen are being played out. Famine is not a natural disaster 
but a social and political crisis where vulnerable groups lose their 
entitlements to food.   This linked to his significant conclusion that 
it is democracy which stops populations from starving - because 
famines do not occur in countries with a free press.  
It was not only the media that ignored the Ethiopian famine in that 
earlier period before the story ‘broke’ and eventually went 
worldwide. The evidence  available through FOI requests 
demonstrates that the UK government was well aware there had 
been a famine in northern Ethiopia since 1982 but chose not to do 
anything about it. The British embassy in Addis was sending 
regular reports of the crisis and urgently requesting for officials to 
come and visit to see the scope of the problem  in the summer of 
1984. They were firmly told by the Foreign Office in London that 
there were more important places to go and this really could not be 
a priority. It was only when the media ‘ revealed’ the story in late 
October that the UK government sprang into action; the Foreign 
Secretary made a statement in Parliament the very next day and 
agreed to send airlifts of food and support other high-profile 
measures. Soon the embassy in Addis was overwhelmed by 
politicians and officials rushing to visit; by December 1984 they 
pleaded with London to reconsider if so many trips were really 
necessary.  
The government was responding to public opinion, galvanized 
through the media. Politicians and officials were trying to be seen 
to help relieve suffering because the story, thanks to Buerk and 
then Bob Geldof, was now a UK domestic issue. MPs and 
Ministers were facing huge popular demands for the government 
to do something, as a result of the media coverage that spread 
throughout the press from broadsheets to the front pages of the 
tabloids. This presented a further insight into news judgments. 
Chris Cramer offered ‘ a set of still pictures from Buerk’s  report on 
the night it was first shown but  he was politely turned down on the 
basis that African famine was not really a story for them.’ A few 
days later the paper was running front page headlines two inches 
high screaming of the Race to Save the Babies. 
In many ways it was admirable that the public were inspired to 
care and empathise with such remote suffering. It was in complete 
contrast to the image of selfish Thatcherite values associated with 
that period. The philanthropic response from all parts of the 
population was unprecedented and it was clearly in reaction to the 
media coverage. Yet in the subsequent years the simple news 
story taken up throughout the media of a sudden ‘event’ arising 
from ‘natural’ causes ie drought has unraveled and the whole 
episode has become a more nuanced and less comfortable one.  
Revisiting Famine  
The preference for keeping the story simple means that the social 
and political context of famine was left out, something that is 
evident today in South Sudan. In Ethiopia the authoritarian regime 
of Mengistu was fighting a major civil war against Tigrayan and 
Eritrean insurgents. It is no accident that these were the areas 
suffering from starvation because to a large extent the government 
was deliberately causing the famine. They were bombing markets 
and trade convoys to disrupt food supply chains. Defence 
spending accounted for half of Ethiopian GDP and the army at that 
time was the  largest in sub-Saharan Africa. The battles between 
government and rebel forces were the biggest in Africa since El 
Alamein. Yet this story of man made misery was barely told. 
Instead it was a simple narrative of failing rains, which kept things 
simple for both journalists and aid agencies. This also suited an 
authoritarian government which did not want foreign Western 
journalists nosing around and criticizing its policies.  Even the UK 
government stuck to the simple narrative. The urgent departmental 
response group which met daily to brief senior ministers in reaction 
to the news reports, called itself the Ethiopian Drought Group – in 
the belief that this was what the problem was all about.  
It was not only the simplification which impaired the reporting but 
crucial omissions and misunderstanding of much of the aid effort. 
There have been furious debates (see BJR vol 21:2,June 2010) 
about exactly what proportion of aid was diverted but there is little 
doubt that it was significant. The guerilla leader Meles, who later 
became the Prime Minister of Ethiopia when the rebels were 
victorious, admitted subsequently how easy it was to fool the 
Western agencies and use the aid for military purposes.  
The Ethiopian government too had deliberate strategies for large 
scale manipulation of aid donations in pursuit of its brutal 
resettlement policies. Victims of famine were lured into feeding 
camps only to be put against their will onto unpressurised planes 
and transported far away from their homes. Some estimates have 
put the deaths resulting from this policy as higher than the original 
famine.  And again the secrecy and brutality of Mengistu’s regime 
made it relatively straightforward to divert aid and deceive 
outsiders. Germaine Greer was one reporter who was persuaded 
to write about the happy peasants being transported to a new 
Eden. Some aid agencies realized what was happening and 
protested – only to be expelled from the country. Others decided it 
was better to keep quiet and stay. The minutes of the Band Aid 
Trust reveal that there were inklings of the misuse and 
misappropriation of aid, but that a view was taken that it was too 
difficult to try and change things.  
Very little of this messy complexity was conveyed by the media at 
the time to audiences who had empathized with the victims, 
donated generously and wanted to see suffering relieved. Aid 
agencies too know that (straightforward) natural disasters are 
much easier to communicate than (trickier) man-made crises. 
Fundraising today for the humanitarian disaster in Syria has been 
pitifully low, and the explanation is that a difficult story without clear 
goodies and baddies is not an easy one to convey either for 
journalists or NGOs. 
So how much has changed in the period since Michael Buerk 
reported from Ethiopia? In 1984 the only voices were from a white 
reporter and a European aid worker. A contemporary news report 
would probably have a wider range of participants. But beyond that 
much is the same. Not only has the problem of the media ignoring 
famine until it is a catastrophe and then simplifying the 
explanation, recurred many times. But even some of the same 
abuses associated with resettlement and villagisation, (which 
sounds homely but is in fact uprooting peasants and forcing them 
elsewhere) are still taking place in Ethiopia today. A Guardian 
investigation by David Smith (Guardian 7/07/14 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/06/britain-supporting-
dictatorship-in-ethiopia) in July 2014 revealed the UK government 
through DIFD is funding such policies.  
Finally there is the vexed question of stereotypical depictions of 
Africa. In the years after 1984 there was much examination and 
criticism of ‘Afro-pessimism’ and negative framing of Africa. But in 
many ways the images used in fundraising and reporting Africa still 
rely on those same old tropes. Still today, the nexus of politics, 
media and aid are influenced by the coverage of a famine 30 years 
ago. 
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